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Abstract
The current study examines how like-minded media consumption and inter-party hostility
contribute to the formation of political stereotypes. More specifically, I investigated stereotypes
about Democrats’ and Republicans’ general willingness to accept inequality among social
groups. Prior research indicates that political stereotypes tend to be exaggerations of actual
liberal-conservative differences in personality. However, researchers know little about the factors
contributing to Democrats’ and Republicans’ expression of exaggerated partisan stereotypes. I
hypothesized that like-minded media consumption, inter-party hostility, and Democratic Party
affiliation would be positive predictors of stereotype exaggeration. To test this hypothesis, 259
U.S. partisan adults completed the Social Dominance Orientation Scale. Using an instructional
manipulation they took the scale three times: As themselves, as if they were the average
Democrat, and as if they were the average Republican. Then participants completed measures of
media consumption, inter-party hostility, and party affiliation. The data indicated that Democrats
exhibited higher levels of stereotype exaggeration when compared to Republicans. Also, likeminded media consumption and inter-party hostility were positive predictors of stereotype
exaggeration. Exploratory analyses indicated that like-minded media consumption predicted
stereotype exaggeration which, in turn, was associated with lower expectations for public
deliberation. I interpret the results by drawing on social identity theory and research in media
studies.
Keywords: political stereotypes, media consumption, affective polarization
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Introduction

From 1994 to 2014 the number of partisans who strongly dislike their political rivals has
doubled (Pew Research Center, 2014b). When I use the word ‘partisans’ I am referring to
Democrats and Republicans, 20 percent of whom feel very cold towards their political rivals
(Iyengar & Krupenkin, 2018). In this highly polarized climate, partisans may insulate themselves
from their political rivals by consuming media that agrees with their own stance. Like-minded
media consumption is problematic because when people do not expose themselves to diverse
viewpoints they become more intolerant (Cappella, Price, & Nir, 2002; Mutz, 2006). Ideological
intolerance might manifest as hostile partisan stereotypes that would further reduce the quality of
public deliberation amongst Democrats and Republicans. Mitigation of this conflict will require
knowledge of why it is happening. One contributing factor described by leading political
psychologist John Jost and colleagues is the psychological differences between liberals and
conservatives (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003; Scherer, Windschitl, & Graham,
2015).1
Within the motivated social cognition framework developed by Jost, liberals and
conservatives differ in their level of traits falling into one of three categories: Epistemic,
existential, and ideological (see Jost, Federico, & Napier, 2009 for review). Epistemic traits refer
to a person’s tendencies for reducing feelings of uncertainty whereas existential traits concern
how a person finds meaning in their lives. Ideological traits describe a person’s willingness to
accept inequality and resist change. Jost and colleagues argue there is an affinity between the
1

Party affiliation and political ideology are closely related constructs. For this reason the
literature I discuss concerning liberals and conservatives applies to Democrats and Republicans
as well.

ideological, existential, and epistemic traits and the core tenets of conservatism. For example,
social dominance orientation, an ideological trait traditionally associated with conservatives,
describes a person’s general willingness to accept inequality among social groups (Ho et al.,
2012; Ho et al., 2015; Jost et al., 2003; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994). People’s
social dominance orientation may incline them to identify as conservative. In doing so, the
policies they endorse are made consistent with their personality in a way that is satisfying.
Liberal-conservative differences in personality are not all that matter when explaining
political polarization. Researchers also should take into account the social stereotypes people
develop about these differences (Scherer et al., 2015). Social stereotypes, a more specific form of
which are political stereotypes, refer to generalizations about groups of people (Allport, 1954).
Social stereotypes are not to be confused with the related concept of prejudice which concerns
stereotypes based on antipathy and inflexible generalizations. Stereotypes have a deep
evolutionary history and are known to play a role in the conflict between groups, like that
between Democrats and Republicans (Neuberg, Kenrick, & Schaller, 2010). The differences
people perceive there to be between Democrats and Republicans can fuel conflict between these
groups.
A growing body of research on political stereotypes investigates people’s beliefs about
the qualities of Democrats and Republicans (e.g. Chambers, Baron, & Inman, 2006; Chambers &
Melnyk, 2006; Graham, Nosek, & Haidt, 2012; Judd & Park, 1993; Scherer et al., 2015). This
research contributes to an understanding of partisan conflict. However, political psychologists
lack insight into how social environments serve to reinforce partisan stereotypes (see Graham et
al., 2012 for discussion). For example, they have not investigated the role of media usage in
stereotype endorsement, which is surprising, given that media portrayals influence cultural

2

stereotypes (e.g. Murphy, 1998). The current study examines the role of party affiliation and
media consumption in predicting stereotype endorsement to expand the field’s knowledge of the
factors associated with partisan stereotypes.
Political stereotypes vary in their degree of accuracy (Judd & Park, 1993), which may be
surprising, given that people often assume stereotypes are inherently inaccurate (Jussim,
Crawford, & Rubenstein, 2015). The idea that stereotypes are fundamentally inaccurate has a
long history in social psychology. Indeed, Katz and Braly (1935) claimed that stereotypes are,
“Fixed impressions which conform very little to the facts [they] pretend to represent (p. 267).”
Despite the widespread belief that stereotypes are inaccurate, there is little empirical support for
such claims (Jussim et al., 2015). In fact, Jussim and colleagues (2016) conducted a metaanalysis and concluded that not only is stereotype accuracy one of the most replicable effects in
social psychology, it is also one of the largest.
Political stereotypes, in particular, have some accuracy in that the direction of liberalconservative differences are correct (Scherer et al., 2015). For instance, partisans perceive
Republicans as having higher levels of social dominance orientation (SDO) than Democrats, and
Republicans actually do have higher levels of this trait. Partisans understand liberal-conservative
differences in personality giving their political stereotypes a degree of accuracy. Yet political
stereotypes are not fully accurate because of the tendency to overestimate the magnitude of
liberal-conservative differences in personality (Graham et al., 2012; Scherer et al., 2015). For
example, consider the extent to which partisans differ in their SDO. This actual difference is
smaller than the degree to which people perceive partisans as different in this trait. As a result,
political stereotypes may tend to be caricature-like exaggerations helping party members set
themselves apart from their political rivals.

3

One account of political stereotypes comes from social identity theorists, who posit that
people differentiate their in-groups from their out-groups in a manner that positively reflects
upon themselves (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). For example, Republicans might frame Democrats’
pro-choice position as one condoning murder to make their own pro-life stance seem more
reasonable by comparison. Greene (1999) was one of the first to apply social identity theory to
party affiliation in the United States. He found a positive association between strength of party
affiliation and the tendency for people to view their stance on policy issues as different from
their political rivals. For instance, the more strongly someone identified as a Democrat, the more
they tended to view their stance on abortion as different from Republicans. Later research built
upon this idea by suggesting that Democrats and Republicans misrepresent their political rivals
to depict themselves, and the group they associate with, in a more positive light (see Chambers &
Melnyk, 2006 for discussion). Beyond making one's self and party look good, partisans might
misrepresent their rivals because it is socially acceptable.
In politics, it is often socially acceptable to voice exaggerated stereotypes. However,
when it comes to other topics such as race, people’s stereotypes tend to underestimate group
traits because it is socially desirable to appear unprejudiced (McCauley, 1995; McCauley & Stit,
1978). The same desire to appear unprejudiced does not apply to politics. Democrats and
Republicans are sometimes open about expressing mild forms of prejudice such as intentionally
avoiding contact with each other (Allport, 1954; Lelkes & Westwood, 2017). In fact, partisans
may feel social pressure to overstate their negative feelings about out-party members (Lelkes,
2016). These negative feelings might manifest as hostile partisan stereotypes that reduce
citizens’ expectations for public deliberation of civic or political issues. One possibility is that
when Democrats and Republicans endorse exaggerated partisan stereotypes they develop lower
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expectations for public deliberation. That is, partisans may be less apt to productively engage
with one another if they have misunderstandings about their political rivals’ character and
exaggerate the extent of their differences.
Liberals and conservatives have stereotypes about the moral character of one another
(Graham et al., 2012). For instance, across the ideological spectrum people perceive
conservatives as placing less emphasis on fairness and egalitarianism than liberals. People are
getting the direction of liberal-conservative differences correct in that conservatives actually do
tend to be less concerned about fairness and egalitarianism. However, the stereotypes are
inaccurate in that people tend to overestimate the magnitude of moral differences between
liberals and conservatives. Moreover, liberals, when compared to conservatives, tend to hold less
accurate political stereotypes about the moral characteristics of people across the ideological
spectrum (Graham et al., 2012). For example, liberals significantly underestimate the typical
conservative’s concern for mitigating harm and encouraging fair outcomes. Researchers have
replicated this general finding for closely related traits such as SDO found in the motivated
social cognition framework (Scherer et al., 2015).
Scherer and colleagues (2015) investigated political stereotypes about epistemic,
existential, and ideological traits. Recall that the ideological traits, one of which is SDO,
concerns people’s acceptance of inequality. They sampled 219 participants whose political
affiliations were largely representative of the U.S. population. Participants took an older version
of the SDO Scale (Pratto et al., 1994) three times by adopting the perspective of the average
Democrat, the average Republican, and themselves. They found participants who affiliated with
both parties tended to exaggerate Republicans’ level of SDO. For our purposes, there are two
takeaways from this study. First, stereotype exaggeration was greatest for SDO when compared
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to the other traits the authors examined. Second, and contrary to the authors’ hypotheses,
affiliation with the Democratic Party tended to be associated with higher levels of stereotype
exaggeration. These findings suggest that Democrats stereotype Republicans as being more
domineering and anti-egalitarian than they actually are.
In sum, people misunderstand the character of Democrats and Republicans. They tend to
view Democrats and Republicans as more different than they actually are, a phenomena called
stereotype exaggeration. While researchers have evidence that stereotype exaggeration occurs,
there remain open questions about its origin. What role has the modern media environment
played in people’s endorsement of partisan stereotypes? Are reports of stereotype exaggeration
expressions of inter-party hostility?
Media and Inter-Party Hostility as Contributors to Political Stereotypes
Like-minded media consumption occurs when people consume media coming from a
source agreeing with their political views. For example, liberals and conservatives may rely on
MSNBC and FOX respectively as their primary or sole source of political news (Pew Research
Center, 2014a). Garrett and Stroud (2014) review three psychological explanations for why
people consume like-minded media, all of which may have some validity. First, cognitive
dissonance theory suggests that by consuming like-minded media people can avoid the
psychological discomfort that often results from exposure to contradictory views (Festinger,
1962). Second, Ziemke (1980) argues that it is easier to process like-minded media. He theorizes
that if people are cognitive misers, then it is only natural for them to select sources that are
simpler to process. Third, empirical research indicates that people tend to view like-minded
media as higher quality (Fischer, Schulz-Hardt, & Frey, 2008). Thus, it would seem only natural
for people to choose the perceived quality and comfort of like-minded media, especially given
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the abundance of choice in the modern media environment.
Researchers disagree regarding the extent to which the modern media environment is
conducive to like-minded media consumption. Iyengar and Hahn (2009) argue that the internet
encourages like-minded media consumption by allowing people to self-select into niche online
communities. There are a couple of caveats however, especially in regards to social media. First,
social media usage can increase people’s exposure to counter-attitudinal sources (Messing &
Westwood, 2014). On major social media platforms people receive suggestions for content based
on popularity. These suggestions often include ideologically diverse sources that people may not
have otherwise encountered. Second, researchers demonstrated that not all of social media is an
echo chamber because it depends on the type of issue people are discussing (Barbera, Jost,
Nagler, Tucker, & Bonneau, 2015). They found that Twitter acts as an echo chamber for political
issues more so than non-political issues. For instance, people are less inclined to engage in likeminded media consumption when discussing the Super Bowl as opposed to midterm elections.
The point is that social media is not inherently an echo chamber. However, like-minded media
consumption does happen on these platforms, and especially for political issues.
Iyengar and Hahn (2009) raise concerns over the consequences of like-minded media
consumption. In particular, they suggest that like-minded media consumption may detract from
the quality of public discourse by insulating people from competing ideas and promoting interparty hostility. A body of empirical research provides support for this argument. Like-minded
media consumption is linked to reduced tolerance for competing views (Cappella, Price, & Nir,
2002; Mutz, 2006), increased support for one’s own party (Arceneaux, Johnson, & Cryderman,
2013; Levendusky, 2013; Stroud, 2010; Wojcieszak, Bimber, Feldman, & Stroud, 2015), and
more negative stereotypes about out-party members (Garrett et al., 2014). Furthermore, like-
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minded media consumption is associated with greater feelings of anger towards one’s political
rivals (Hasell & Weeks, 2016). These findings suggest that like-minded media consumption can
lead people to feel more hostile towards their political rivals.
Affective polarization refers to the increasing level of mutual hostility between
Democrats and Republicans (Iyengar, Sood, & Lelkes, 2012). Political scientists note that
affective polarization has risen for 50 years and explain this trend using social identity theory
(Iyengar et al., 2012; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Partisans identify with their political party, and in
doing so, develop emotional attachments to it (Greene, 1999). Increasingly the emotional warmth
that partisans feel towards their in-party is accompanied by coldness towards their out-party
(Iyengar & Krupenkin, 2018). Out-party hostility can be expressed in three different ways
(Iyengar et al., 2012): 1) as a kind of prejudice where partisans believe their political rivals
possess negative traits (e.g. being close-minded), 2) as partisans’ reluctance to interact with rival
party members such as holding negative attitudes about their son or daughter marrying an outparty member (see Bogardus, 1925 for discussion of social distance), and 3) as out-party hostility
that is seen when partisans harbor negative or cold feelings about their political rivals.
Given the divisive nature of affective polarization, researchers have expressed growing
interest in understanding its causes and consequences (e.g. Iyengar, Jackman, & Hahn, 2016;
Sood, Iyengar, & Dropp, 2012). A concern is that high levels of affective polarization might
detract from perceived governmental legitimacy or the right to rule (Iyengar et al., 2012). If
people feel disdain for their political rivals then they might not feel those rivals have the right to
implement policy. This tendency to view out-party governance as illegitimate may fuel
polarization even more. In addition to these political concerns are psychological ones, namely,
how affective polarization might encourage widespread endorsement of partisan stereotypes. For
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example, party members exposed to hostile campaign ads tended to report higher levels of
affective polarization and endorsed more negative stereotypes about their political rivals (Sood,
Iyengar, & Dropp, 2012). This finding suggests a close relationship between inter-party hostility
and partisans’ endorsement of political stereotypes.
The purpose of the current study is to provide a more thorough and rigorous assessment
of the factors contributing to partisan stereotypes. In doing so the current study helps to explain
the divisiveness of contemporary politics, while being one of the first to investigate the affective
and situational precursors to stereotype exaggeration. Based on prior research in media studies
and political psychology, I pose four separate hypotheses. First, political stereotypes regarding
SDO will be exaggerations of the actual psychological differences between liberals and
conservatives. Second, Democrats will exhibit higher levels of stereotype exaggeration than
Republicans. Third, like-minded media consumption will be a positive predictor of stereotype
exaggeration. Fourth, the components of affective polarization (i.e., out-party trait ratings,
feeling thermometer, and inter-party marriage) will be positive predictors of stereotype
exaggeration.
Method
Participants
I recruited 301 U.S. participants via Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk), each of whom
had at least a 95% acceptance rate on past MTurk tasks. Researchers have used this acceptance
criterion to collect at least one sample representative of the U.S. population regarding liberalconservative differences in personality (Clifford, Jewell, & Waggoner, 2015). Also, MTurk
samples report levels of SDO comparable to in-person samples (Gamblin, Winslow, Lindsay,
Newsom, & Kehn, 2016). All participants received an informed consent form which can be
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found in Appendix A. Each participant was paid 75 cents and the study took an average of 10
minutes to complete. Of the 301 participants, 14% did not identify with either the Democratic or
Republican Party and were excluded from analyses (see Table 1 for full sample demographics). I
used this exclusion criterion because only Democrats and Republicans have a clear in-party and
out-party.
The final sample consisted of 259 participants. Each participant completed the Social
Dominance Orientation Scale as a Democrat, a Republican and as themselves. At the end of each
SDO Scale I asked participants which perspective they had adopted while completing the
measure. These three items were manipulation checks. Eighty-four percent of participants passed
all three manipulation checks, 6.2% passed two, 8.1% passed one, and 1.5% passed none. I did
not exclude participants for failing manipulation checks because results stayed the same
regardless.
Sixty-seven percent of participants identified as Democrats and 33% Republican. The
mean age in the sample was 36.42 years with 50% of participants identifying as female and 50%
male. Seventy-five percent of the sample identified as White, 11.6% African American, 8.4%
Asian, .8% American Indian, .4% Native Hawaiian, and 2.8% other. The median level of
education was a bachelor's degree, and the median income was $40,000-$50,000 a year. Overall,
the sample was typical of the MTurk participant pool: Largely White, younger, and left-leaning
(Berinsky et al., 2012; Huff & Tingley, 2015).
Measures
SDO Scale. The newest version of the SDO Scale (Ho et al., 2015) measures a person’s
tendency to be domineering and anti-egalitarian. Dominance refers to a person's desire for
subjugating groups they have deemed subordinate, and anti-egalitarianism concerns a person's
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preferences for maintaining an unequal distribution of resources. The SDO Scale asks
participants to rate the degree to which they Strongly Oppose(1) to Strongly Favor(7) a series of
16 statements. Example items include, “Some groups of people must be kept in their place,” and,
“Group equality should not be our primary goal.” Higher scores indicate a greater level of SDO.
Since I asked participants to take the SDO Scale from three perspectives, there are three
measures of reliability (Average Democrat ∝ = .95; Average Republican ∝ = .94; Self ∝ = .94).
Like-minded media consumption. Hasell and Weeks (2016) created a four-item
measure of pro- and counter-attitudinal media usage. The scale asks participants how often they
consume news from two liberal sources and two conservative sources. An example item
includes, “How often do you consume news from a major national organization that is frequently
characterized as favoring liberal positions or Democratic candidates, such as The New York
Times or MSNBC?” Response options range from 1(Never) to 5(Very Often). A variable for proattitudinal media consumption was calculated by taking participants’ average consumption of
like-minded sources (∝ = .61). Similarly, the variable for counter-attitudinal media averaged
participants’ consumption of attitude-inconsistent sources (∝ = .65). A variable for like-minded
media consumption was calculated by taking participants’ average consumption of like-minded
sources and subtracting from it their average consumption of counter-attitudinal sources (Likeminded media consumption = Average consumption of pro-attitudinal sources – average
consumption of counter-attitudinal sources). Higher scores represent a greater degree of likeminded media consumption.
Affective polarization. I used three measures of affective polarization drawn from
Iyengar and colleagues (2012). Affective polarization concerns the widening gap between how
warm partisans feel towards their in-party versus their out-party. The following measures of
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feeling thermometer, inter-party marriage, and out-party trait ratings assess this affective divide.
First, participants reported how favorable they felt toward Democrats and Republicans
using two scales. Response options range from 1(Very unfavorable) to 7(Very favorable). I took
each participant’s in-party rating and subtracted from it their out-party rating. The higher a
participant’s feeling thermometer score, the more disapproving they were of their out-party.
Second, participants completed a two-item measure of social distance assessing how
they would feel if their son or daughter married a Democratic/Republican Party supporter.
Response options range from 1(Very upset) to 5(Very pleased). I took how pleased participants
would be with an in-party marriage and subtracted from it how pleased they would be with an
out-party marriage. Higher scores suggest that participants were more inclined towards socially
distancing themselves from their political rivals.
Third, participants described the extent to which they agree rival party members possess a
series of traits. There were five traits with positive valence and five traits with negative valence. I
used the same traits as Iyengar and colleagues (2012) except for 'intolerant.' I added this
trait because I view it as a negative attribute that is highly relevant to today's public discourse.
The negative traits were intolerant, hypocritical, selfish, mean, and close-minded (∝ = .89). The
positive traits were patriotic, intelligent, honest, open-minded, and generous (∝ = .77). Response
options ranged from 1(Strongly disagree) to 7(Strongly agree). For each participant I took the
average of the negative trait ratings and subtracted from it the average of the positive trait
ratings. Higher scores indicate a stronger belief that one’s political rivals possess negative
qualities.
Social media engagement. Participants completed a four-item measure of social media
engagement (∝ = .83) drawn from Yang, Barnidge, and Rojas (2017). Participants were asked
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how often they read, share, and express their views about current events on social media. An
example item is, “How often do you use social media to express your views on current issues?”
Response options ranged from 1(Never) to 5(Very often). Higher scores indicate greater
engagement with social media.
Expectations for public deliberation. To begin to connect partisan stereotypes to
political behavior, I asked about participants’ expectations for the civic process of public
meetings. They were asked to imagine themselves at a town hall meeting with approximately 30
people discussing national policy issues. The instructions are adapted from Hwang, Kim, and
Huh (2014) (see Appendix C). At this hypothetical meeting, participants were to imagine there
would be both Democrats and Republicans. Participants answered four questions about their
expectations for how this meeting would go (∝ = .87). An example item includes, “The
conversation would resolve conflicts among participants with differing views on the issues.”
Response options ranged from 1(Strongly disagree) to 7(Strongly agree). The greater a
participant’s average score, the more positive their expectations were for the discussion.
Party affiliation. To measure party affiliation I presented participants the following
question, “In general, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an
independent, or something else?” (American National Election Studies, 2008). If participants
selected Republican or Democrat, they received a follow-up question asking them if they leaned
Democrat/Republican or if they were strongly Democrat/Republican. If participants selected
either independent or something else they received an additional question asking if they thought
of themselves as closer to being a Democrat, Republican, or neither. Participants who leaned
towards the Democratic or Republican Party were classified as partisans in accordance with
conventional practice (e.g. Iyengar & Krupenkin, 2018). If they selected neither then they were
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classified as independents and I did not include them in the subsequent analyses.
Design
The current study adopted the methodology for assessing stereotype exaggeration used by
Scherer and colleagues (2015). It is a three level within-subjects design. The independent
variable was the viewpoint through which participants took the SDO Scale. The dependent
variable was the degree of stereotype exaggeration participants reported. Stereotype exaggeration
was computed by taking participants’ mean SDO when they completed the scale as the average
Republican and subtracting from it their mean SDO when they completed the scale as the
average Democrat (Stereotype exaggeration = mean SDO as average Republican - mean SDO as
average Democrat). The resulting variable represents the degree to which participants perceived
Democrats and Republicans as having different levels of SDO. I call this variable the perceived
spread score.
Procedure
Participants received the informed consent form using the Qualtrics survey site. They
indicated their agreement to the consent terms by clicking the forward arrow at the bottom of the
screen. Then they were provided instructions about how they would adopt three different
viewpoints when taking the SDO Scale as the average Democrat, as the average Republican, and
as themselves. I asked participants which viewpoint they had adopted after completing each
scale. These items served as manipulation checks. Appendix B contains the manipulation check
and viewpoint instructions. Viewpoint order was counterbalanced by randomly assigning
participants to one of the six possible viewpoint orders. I created a nominal variable representing
the order with which each participant took the surveys to assess possible order effects.
Upon completing the scale and manipulation checks from all three viewpoints,
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participants completed items measuring party affiliation, voting behavior, and political ideology.
Next, they were then given measures of affective polarization, like-minded media consumption,
social media engagement, and expectations for public deliberation. The order of these scales was
randomized to mitigate order effects. Finally, participants answered questions regarding their
demographic characteristics. These included age, gender, ethnicity, state of residence, political
ideology, income, and education. Upon completing the demographic questions, participants were
thanked and provided with a debriefing statement.
Results
Testing for Partisan Stereotype Exaggeration
Using SPSS 25.0, I conducted all confirmatory tests at α = .05. Table 2 contains the
means and standard deviations for all continuous variables in the current study. There were no
order effects. A one-way between-subjects ANOVA found no effect of order on stereotype
exaggeration, F(5, 253) = 0.99, MSE = 4.96, p > .05. In the section that follows I use a question
and answer format to test hypothesis one: Political stereotypes regarding SDO will be
exaggerations of the actual psychological differences between liberals and conservatives.
Do political stereotypes regarding SDO exist?
Yes. A one-sample t-test indicated that participants perceived the average Republican (M
= 4.99, SD = 1.36) as being higher in SDO than the average Democrat (M = 2.28, SD = 1.29),
t(258) = 32.17, p < .001, d = 2.00. Figure 1 depicts overlapping histograms that describe
partisans’ perception of the average Democrat’s and the average Republican’s level of SDO.
Do these stereotypes reflect actual liberal-conservative differences in personality?
Yes. An independent samples t-test revealed that Republicans (M = 3.40, SD = 1.29),
when rating themselves, reported higher SDO than did Democrats when rating themselves (M =
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1.96, SD = 1.08), t(257) = -9.45, p < .001, d = 1.25. Figure 2 contains violin plots that depict the
distribution of actual Democrats’ and Republicans’ SDO.
Are these stereotypes exaggerations of actual liberal-conservative differences?
Yes. First, I calculated the actual spread which was equal to Republicans’ mean SDO
minus Democrats’. Second, I determined the perceived spread which was equal to participants’
mean SDO as the average Republican minus their mean SDO as the average Democrat. Third, I
conducted a one-sample t-test which revealed that the perceived spread was greater than the
actual spread, t(258) = 9.22, p < .001, d = .57. In other words, participants perceived Democrats
and Republicans as more different in their level of SDO than they actually were.
Which party was more so the subject of exaggerated political stereotypes?
Participants reported stereotype exaggeration. To clarify the source of the exaggeration I
calculated the extent to which participants overestimated each party’s level of SDO. I calculated
an exaggeration-about-Democrats score by taking participants’ mean SDO as the average
Democrat and subtracting from it the mean SDO of actual Democrats in the sample. Similarly, I
calculated an exaggeration-about-Republicans score by taking participants’ mean SDO as the
average Republican and subtracting from it the mean SDO of actual Republicans. Overall, the
exaggeration-about-Republicans score was positive and significantly different from zero, t(258)
= 18.90, p < .001, d = 1.17, as was the exaggeration-about-Democrats score, t(258) = 3.97, p <
.001, d = .25. The exaggeration-about-Republicans score was larger than the exaggeration-aboutDemocrats score, t(258) = 15.10, p < .001, d = .93. Participants exaggerated Republicans’ level
of SDO to a greater degree than they did Democrats’.
In sum, participants evidenced partisan stereotypes in that they perceived the average
Republican as higher in SDO than the average Democrat. These stereotypes mirrored actual
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liberal-conservative differences in personality in that Republicans in the sample actually were
higher in SDO. Furthermore, participants perceived Democrats and Republicans as more
different in their SDO than they truly were. In other words, they reported stereotype
exaggeration. Reports of exaggerated stereotypes resulted from participants overestimating
Republicans’ level of SDO.
Bivariate Correlations
Bivariate correlations were calculated among all of the continuous variables in the current
study (i.e., social media engagement, expectations for public deliberation, party affiliation, outparty trait ratings, feeling thermometer, inter-party marriage, like-minded media consumption,
stereotype exaggeration). I conducted point-biserial correlations for gender with each of the
continuous variables. Male participants were coded as a 1 and female participants coded as a 2. I
used Spearman Rank Order Correlations to examine the relationship between the one ordinal
variable, education, and the continuous variables. Of particular interest were the correlations
between stereotype exaggeration and the independent variables described in the hypotheses.
Stereotype exaggeration was statistically significantly correlated with party affiliation (r(257) = .38, p < .001), like-minded media consumption (r(257) = .37, p < .001), feeling thermometer
(r(257) = .21, p < .01), out-party trait ratings (r(257) = .33, p < .001), and inter-party marriage
(r(257) = .19, p < .01). Table 3 contains all correlations.
Testing the Precursors to Stereotype Exaggeration
I used regression analyses to test hypotheses two, three, and four. Hypothesis two is that
Democrats will exhibit higher levels of stereotype exaggeration than Republicans. Hypotheses
three and four, respectively, are that like-minded media consumption and affective polarization
will be positive predictors of stereotype exaggeration. To test these hypotheses I analyzed the
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data using hierarchical linear regression. The independent variables were gender, education,
social media engagement, party affiliation, like-minded media consumption, feeling
thermometer, inter-party marriage, and out-party trait ratings. The dependent variable was
stereotype exaggeration. Stereotype exaggeration was calculated by taking participants’ mean
SDO as the average Republican and subtracting from it participants’ mean SDO as the average
Democrat. I begin by reporting the correlations which are most relevant to the hypotheses. Then
I confirm that the assumptions of linear regression were met before testing four models.
Meeting Assumptions of Linear Regression
I confirmed that four assumptions of multivariate regression analyses were met. First, to
evaluate if there were problems with heteroscedasticity, the standardized residuals for this
regression analysis were plotted against the standardized predicted values (see Figure 3). There
was no indication of heteroscedasticity in this graph of residuals; however, there appeared to be a
few outlier cases. Second, I calculated a Mahalanobis distance value for each participant which
indicated the existence of three outlier cases (df = 8, p < .001, cutoff = 26.13) (see Kannan &
Manoj, 2015). I included the few outlier cases in my analyses because results did not change
when these data points were excluded. Third, and consistent with best practices (Cain, Zhang, &
Yuan, 2017), I tested the assumption of normality. To do this I examined the skewness of the
standardized residuals (γ1 = -.80). The distribution was negatively skewed reflecting the tendency
for partisans to perceive Republicans as higher in SDO than Democrats. A reflected log base 10
transformation of the dependent variable, stereotype exaggeration, did not change the results.
Fourth, I checked for issues with multicollinearity by examining the correlations among the
independent variables (see Table 3). No correlations exceeded .7, suggesting a sufficient level of
statistical independence amongst the predictor variables. In sum, I met the assumptions necessary
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for conducting multivariate regression analyses, with the exception of a distribution of residuals
that is negatively skewed.
Control Variables
For each of the regression models I included three control variables. I did this to more
accurately assess the unique contribution of party affiliation, like-minded media consumption,
and affective polarization to stereotype exaggeration. First, I used gender as a control variable
because women tend to associate themselves with the Democratic Party (Pew Research Center,
2016c), and Democrats tend to express higher levels of stereotype exaggeration than Republicans
(Scherer et al., 2015). Second, higher education is tied to Democratic Party affiliation so I added
education as a control variable (Pew Research Center, 2016a). Third, I included social media
engagement as a control variable because it could potentially affect stereotype exaggeration. For
instance, when people engage with social media they may expose themselves to more sources
disagreeing with their views (Messing & Westwood, 2014). This counter-attitudinal exposure
might provide people with a more accurate view of their political rivals thereby reducing their
stereotype exaggeration.
Model One: Control Variables Predicting Stereotype Exaggeration
The purpose of model one was to establish a baseline for the predictive ability of the
control variables. Party affiliation, affective polarization, and like-minded media consumption
should then predict stereotype exaggeration above and beyond the controls. In the first model,
gender, education, and social media engagement together were statistically significant predictors
of stereotype exaggeration, F(3, 255) = 10.44, p < .001, MSE = 4.47, R2 = .11. Gender was a
statistically significant positive predictor of stereotype exaggeration with female participants
reporting higher levels of stereotype exaggeration than male participants did. Social media
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engagement was a statistically significant negative predictor of stereotype exaggeration.
Education was not a statistically significant predictor of stereotype exaggeration, though its beta
weight was in the predicted direction. Table 6 contains the results of the hierarchical regression
analyses.
Model Two: Party Affiliation Predicting Stereotype Exaggeration
In the second model party affiliation was added because prior research has suggested
Democratic Party affiliation is associated with higher levels of stereotype exaggeration (e.g.
Scherer et al., 2015). The combination of the controls and party affiliation were statistically
significant predictors of stereotype exaggeration, F(4, 254) = 20.38, p < .001, MSE = 3.82, R2 =
.24. Party affiliation added a statistically significant change in the prediction of stereotype
exaggeration, ΔF(1, 254) = 44.83, p < .001, ΔR2 = .13 (see Tables 4 and 5). Female participants
reported statistically significantly higher levels of stereotype exaggeration than male participants
did. Social media engagement and party affiliation were statistically significant negative
predictors of stereotype exaggeration. The more strongly participants identified with the
Democratic Party the greater their level of stereotype exaggeration. Education was not a
statistically significant predictor of stereotype exaggeration. Model two suggests that party
affiliation is an important contributor to stereotype exaggeration above and beyond gender,
social media engagement, and education.
Model Three: Media Consumption and Inter-Party Hostility Predicting Stereotype
Exaggeration
In model three I entered like-minded media consumption and the components of affective
polarization (i.e., out-party trait ratings, feeling thermometer, and inter-party marriage). I added
these variables to test the hypotheses that like-minded media consumption and affective
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polarization would be positive predictors of stereotype exaggeration. Figure 4 depicts model
three of the hierarchical multiple regression using standardized coefficients. The combination of
the control variables, party affiliation, like-minded media consumption, and the components of
affective polarization were statistically significant predictors of stereotype exaggeration, F(8,
250) = 14.62, p < .001, MSE = 3.49, R2 = .32. Like-minded media consumption and the
components of affective polarization added a statistically significant change in the prediction of
stereotype exaggeration, ΔF(4, 250) = 6.95, p < .001, ΔR2 = .07. Gender, social media
engagement, and party affiliation remained statistical significant predictors of stereotype
exaggeration. Out-party trait ratings and like-minded media consumption were both statistically
significant positive predictors of stereotype exaggeration. Education, feeling thermometer, and
inter-party marriage were not statistically significant predictors of stereotype exaggeration. The
takeaway is that like-minded media consumption was a robust predictor of stereotype
exaggeration because its beta weight was statistically significant even with a set of rigorous
controls. Only the out-party trait rating component of affective polarization was a statistically
significant predictor of stereotype exaggeration.
Model Four: Like-Minded Media Consumption → Stereotype Exaggeration →
Expectations for Public Deliberation
I tested an exploratory model to better understand how media consumption impacts
attitudes towards public deliberation. This model uses stereotype exaggeration as a mediator of
the relationship between like-minded media consumption and expectations for public
deliberation. To reduce the probability of a type two error the alpha level was set to .10. I
conducted these analyses using the Hayes’ (2013) PROCESS macros (Model 4). As in the
confirmatory analyses, gender, social media engagement, and education were kept as control
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variables. I choose to have indirect effects bootstrapped 5000 times. In this model, the
independent variable was like-minded media consumption, the mediator was stereotype
exaggeration, and the dependent variable was expectations for public deliberation. That is, I
tested whether like-minded media consumption exerts its effect on expectations for public
deliberation through stereotype exaggeration. Figure 5 depicts the mediation model using
unstandardized regression coefficients.
Like-minded media consumption was a statistically significant positive predictor of
stereotype exaggeration, b = 0.64, SE =.10, p < .001. In addition, like-minded media
consumption was a statistically significant negative predictor of expectations for public
deliberation, b = -.13, SE = .07, p < .10. That is, participants who consumed more media
consistent with their own views tended to have lower expectations for the quality of public
deliberation between Democrats and Republicans. When I controlled for stereotype
exaggeration, like-minded media consumption was no longer a statistically significant predictor
of expectations for public deliberation, b = -.07, SE = .08, p > .35. These findings suggest that
stereotype exaggeration fully mediates the relationship between like-minded media consumption
and expectations for public deliberation. The combination of like-minded media consumption,
stereotype exaggeration, and the control variables explained 8% of the variance in expectations
for public deliberation, F(5,253) = 4.68, MSE = 1.97, p < .001, R2 = .08. A Sobel test indicated a
small negative indirect effect of like-minded media consumption on expectations for public
deliberation, b = -.06, SE = .03, Z = -2.00, p < .05. In other words, greater like-minded media
consumption predicted higher levels of stereotype exaggeration which, in turn, predicted lower
expectations for public deliberation.
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Discussion
The current study reveals the relationship between media consumption, inter-party
hostility, and partisan stereotypes. In particular, I investigated stereotypes about the average
Democrat’s and the average Republican’s level of SDO. Social dominance captures a person’s
general willingness to accept inequality between social groups (Ho et al., 2012; Ho et al., 2015;
Pratto et al., 1994). Furthermore, this trait is tied to conservativism, disagreeableness, and
prejudice (Ekehammar, Akrami, Gylje, & Zakrisson, 2004). Using an instructional manipulation
and the SDO Scale (Ho et al., 2015), I examined partisan stereotype exaggeration. Partisan
stereotypes are characterized by people viewing the personalities of Democrats and Republicans
as more different than they actually are (e.g. Scherer et al., 2015). The current study helps to
explain why.
Partisan stereotypes about SDO exaggerated actual liberal-conservative differences in
this trait. I found three supporting pieces of evidence for the existence of partisan stereotypes.
First, I demonstrated the existence of political stereotypes by findings that participants perceived
Republicans as having higher levels of SDO than Democrats. Interestingly, participants
perceived the average Democrat and Republican as more different in their level of SDO than in
the 2015 study by Scherer and colleagues. This finding may be the result of a divisive 2016
presidential election with campaign ads promoting both inter-party hostility and caricature-like
political stereotypes (see Sood, Iyengar, & Dropp, 2012 for discussion of campaign ads). Second,
participants reported political stereotypes that reflected actual liberal-conservative differences in
personality. Not only were Republicans perceived as higher in SDO than Democrats,
Republicans in the sample actually were higher in this trait. This finding replicates a large body
of work which uses the motivated social cognition framework to describe how liberals and
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conservatives differ in their personality (see Jost et al., 2003 for review).
Third, participants perceived Democrats and Republicans as being more different in SDO
than partisans in the sample actually were. In other words, participants reported stereotype
exaggeration and did so in a manner consistent with prior research using the older version of the
SDO Scale (Pratto et al., 1994; Scherer et al., 2015). The current study adds to the literature by
demonstrating that participants report stereotype exaggeration when completing the most recent
version of the SDO Scale (Ho et al., 2015). This contribution provides a new form of pragmatic
validity for social dominance theory by suggesting that researchers can use its most recent
measure for investigating partisan stereotypes (Graham et al., 2012; Pratto et al., 1994).
Partisan stereotypes tended to exaggerate the average Republican’s level of SDO more
than the average Democrat’s. That is, participants perceived Republicans as higher in SDO than
Republicans in the sample actually were. The same was true for Democrats but to a much lesser
extent. This may have to do with the fact that high SDO is traditionally associated with
Republicans (Scherer et al., 2015). Partisans may tend to exaggerate the characteristics of
political groups that they perceive as high rather than low on a given trait. The reason is that high
levels of a trait will tend to receive more of partisans’ attention making them more likely to be
the subject of cognitive biases. For instance, partisans might notice Republicans’ high level of
SDO then proceed to actively look for evidence that Republicans are high in this trait.
Confirmation bias of this kind may lead partisans to develop exaggerated beliefs about how
Democrats and Republicans differ in their SDO (see Nickerson, 1998 for review of confirmation
bias). If I used a trait such as openness to experience that is associated with liberals (Scherer et
al., 2015), then maybe Democrats’ high level of this trait would be the subject of confirmation
bias, resulting in Democrats rather than Republicans becoming the subject of exaggerated
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stereotypes.
If we define prejudice as holding social stereotypes with antipathy and inflexibility
(Allport, 1954), then participants who reported stereotype exaggeration may be exhibiting
prejudice. It depends on their attitudes towards SDO. Unlike out-party trait ratings where the
valence of each item is clear (e.g. ‘close-minded’ is negative), on the SDO Scale some of the
items have ambiguous valence. For instance, consider this item, “It’s probably a good thing that
certain groups are at the top and other groups are at the bottom.” Whether it is hostile to describe
a party member as endorsing an item like this will depend on whom you ask. For Republicans,
given their willingness to accept inequality (e.g. Jost et al., 2003), they may have a more neutral
or even positive attitude towards SDO. Democrats, in contrast, tend to be in favor of
egalitarianism and are likely at odds with the explicitly anti-egalitarian sentiment underlying
SDO. As a result, Democrats’ expression of stereotype exaggeration may constitute prejudice
because of a hostile sentiment underlying it. Furthermore, if Democrats were to inflexibly
exaggerate all Republicans’ endorsement of anti-egalitarianism then this would be further
evidence of prejudice. This conclusion is consistent with the idea that partisans are comfortable
expressing mild forms of prejudice towards their political rivals (Lelkes & Westwood, 2017).
I found that Democrats expressed higher levels of stereotype exaggeration than
Republicans. This finding is consistent with some studies (Graham et al., 2012; Scherer et al.,
2015); however, it contradicts existing research on how liberals and conservatives differ in their
tendency to stereotype. For instance, one argument is that conservatives tend to rely on
stereotypes because they promote feelings of certainty (Stern, West, & Rule, 2015). Accordingly,
research has found that conservatives tend to hold unfavorable attitudes towards counterstereotypic people and dislike them because they take away from their feelings of certainty about
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the social world. This bias for certainty helps explain why conservatives tend to rely on physical
appearance stereotypes when categorizing people as gay or straight (Stern, West, Jost, & Rule,
2013). What do these findings imply for public discourse? Olcaysoy Okten and Saribay (2018)
found that while anticipating a conversation with someone holding opposing ideological views,
conservatives tended to activate political stereotypes while liberals did not. Liberals exhibited
more of the self-regulation necessary to suppress their stereotypes than did conservatives.
Democrats might be better than Republicans at suppressing political stereotypes, even if they are
more likely to report endorsing some of them.
Social identity theorists can explain why Democrats reported higher rates of stereotype
exaggeration (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Democrats may distinguish themselves from Republicans
by exaggerating how different the two parties are in terms of SDO. Since Democrats are likely to
view SDO negatively, the lower they are on this trait relative to Republicans the better.
Republicans, in contrast, might view SDO as more positive thereby reducing their incentive to
differentiate themselves from Democrats on this trait. In other words, Republicans have less of a
reason to report stereotype exaggeration because doing so does not reflect positively on their ingroup like it does for Democrats. The takeaway is that partisans’ attitudes towards traits are
crucial to consider. These attitudes shape how Democrats and Republicans will use partisan
stereotypes to distinguish themselves from their political rivals.
Media Consumption and Affective Polarization as Predictors of Stereotype Exaggeration
Partisans who consumed more like-minded media in the form of blogs and television
shows evidenced higher stereotype exaggeration. In contrast, partisans who shared, mobilized,
and read articles on social media tended to have lower levels of stereotype exaggeration. Perhaps
counterintuitively, social media platforms can encourage cross-cutting exposure (Messing &
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Westwood, 2014). This exposure occurs when platforms recommend content to users based on
social endorsements rather than whether the source has a liberal or conservative bias. Most social
media platforms have a section listing the most liked or shared posts which can encourage users
to consume content disagreeing with their views. The same cross-cutting recommendations do
not occur when individuals use TV as their news source because the platform lacks liking and
sharing. For this reason, traditional media platforms (e.g. TV) might be more likely to encourage
like-minded consumption and in doing so magnify stereotype exaggeration and its negative
consequences for public deliberation.
Partisans who consumed more like-minded blogs and TV shows reported increased
stereotype exaggeration which, in turn, predicted lower expectations for public deliberation. One
might argue that stereotype exaggeration affects partisans’ expectations for public deliberation,
while having a negligible impact on actual deliberation. Why is that? When partisans engage in
public deliberation they may rely primarily on information about individuals rather than political
stereotypes (see Crawford, Jussim, Madon, Cain, & Stevens, 2011 for discussion of political
person perception model). For instance, imagine a town hall meeting consisting of Democrats
and Republicans. They may enter the meeting with discouraging partisan stereotypes, but then
discard them as they learn about the individuals in attendance. Alternatively, those same
discouraging stereotypes may set in motion a self-fulfilling prophecy (see Fleming & Jussim,
1996 for review). Attendees’ reliance on discouraging stereotypes rather than information about
individuals may increase the odds that their low expectations come true. This self-fulfilling
prophecy is a troubling possibility. As partisans’ low expectations are realized their stereotypes
about Democrats and Republicans may become more entrenched and hostile.
I found partial support for the idea that inter-party hostility encourages stereotype
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exaggeration. Attitudes about inter-party marriage and the feeling thermometer did not predict
stereotype exaggeration. However, out-party trait ratings did. Out-party trait ratings assess interparty antipathy by measuring the degree to which partisans describe their political rivals using
negative traits (e.g. being hypocritical). As such, out-party trait ratings are a measure of
prejudice. The observed relationship between out-party trait ratings and stereotype exaggeration
provides additional support for the idea that reports of stereotype exaggeration are indicative of
prejudice. This interpretation suggests that affective polarization, and its trait rating component
in particular, can have negative psychological consequences in the form of more prejudice. Put
simply, one form of prejudice between Democrats and Republicans fuels another.
The current study’s findings stand in contrast to prior research which has focused on the
political, rather than psychological, consequences of affective polarization (Iyengar et al., 2012).
For instance, one political consequence of affective polarization might be that partisans view the
government as less legitimate when out-party members are elected. The present results provide
some support for the idea that affective polarization has negative consequences for politics and
the psyche. That is, inter-party hostility might promote polarizing stereotypes. These stereotypes
are a product of human social cognition and its long history of fueling conflict between groups
(e.g. Neuberg et al., 2010). Indeed, conflict between Democrats and Republicans might be
reduced if they understood that they are more similar to each other than they think (Graham et
al., 2012).
Limitations and Future Directions
The current study faces four main limitations. First, I used a self-report measure of likeminded media consumption that may lack in construct validity. The fragmentation of the modern
media environment has made it increasingly difficult to define what constitutes ‘political’ media
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(Dilliplane, Goldman, & Mutz, 2013). When people do not know what qualifies as political
media, it becomes more challenging for them to provide accurate estimates of their consumption.
Compounding the problem is the fact that people typically think about what channels they watch
not how long they watched it. For instance, a person might remember they watched MSNBC, but
find it cognitively taxing to recall how long they viewed the channel. Future research would do
well to measure like-minded media consumption with a behavioral paradigm that is more
ecologically valid (see Iyengar & Hahn, 2009; Messing & Westwood, 2014). Such a paradigm
might entail developing a web application that discreetly tracks users’ engagement with content.
Another alternative would be to ask participants if they regularly consume content from an
inclusive list of media platforms (Dilliplane et al., 2013).
Second, I used a potentially unreliable measure of like-minded media consumption. This
measure was a difference score constructed by taking participants’ pro-attitudinal media
consumption and subtracting from it their counter-attitudinal consumption. As Trafimow (2005)
notes, the reliability of a difference score is impacted by the reliability of its component
measures. Both measures of pro and counter-attitudinal media consumption had low reliability
suggesting that my measure of like-minded media consumption was unreliable. Similarly, I used
brief measures of inter-party marriage and the feeling thermometer which may have had low
reliability because they had so few items. This helps to explain why these two scales did not
predict stereotype exaggeration. Future researchers would do well to develop more reliable selfreport measures of affective polarization and like-minded media consumption for when
behavioral measures are not viable. Third, I only included Democrats and Republicans in my
analyses because they have a clear in-party and out-party. This inclusion criterion makes it
difficult to assess how stereotype exaggeration operates in independent voters who constitute
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roughly 40 percent of the population (Pew Research Center, 2016b).
Fourth, the direction of causality is difficult to assess because I used correlational
analyses. For instance, like-minded media consumption might have caused stereotype
exaggeration, or vice versa, stereotype exaggeration might have caused like-minded media
consumption. If partisans view their political rivals as vastly different from themselves (i.e., high
stereotype exaggeration), then they may be more motivated to avoid counter-attitudinal content
and consume like-minded media. One can make a similar point about affective polarization.
Stereotype exaggeration may fuel inter-party hostility rather than the other way around. Future
studies could experimentally manipulate affective polarization, via a priming paradigm, to
evaluate its effect on stereotype exaggeration. Alternatively, a longitudinal design, as opposed to
the current study’s cross-sectional one, would provide more compelling causal support (see
Turnes & Ernst, 2016 for discussion of longitudinal mediation). For instance, researchers could
measure affective polarization and like-minded media consumption during a pretest, and then
assess stereotype exaggeration during the posttest six months later.
Theoretical Implications
The current study begins an exploration of the situational factors (e.g. media
consumption) explaining stereotype exaggeration. Furthermore, it serves as a foundation for
research examining the person by situation interactions which underlie stereotype exaggeration
(see Higgins, 1990 for discussion of this theoretical framework). For instance, openness to
experience, a person factor, may interact with like-minded media consumption, a situational
factor, to explain stereotype exaggeration. The idea is that partisans with high openness would be
less prone to like-minded media consumption and its encouragement of political stereotypes.
These person by situation interactions are vital to study for many reasons including, but not

30

limited to, their impact on public deliberation. Consider that the current polarized political
climate (e.g. Iyengar & Krupenkin, 2018), a situational factor, might interact with partisan
stereotypes, a person factor, to make pubic deliberation less productive. This example highlights
how partisan stereotypes, and their consequences, are integrally connected with a dynamic social
environment.
Concluding Remarks
“Deliberation may be defined as civil interaction between citizens for the purpose of
analyzing a social or political issue. As such, it is reasonable to conceive of this
communicative practice as the heart and soul of democracy. (Center for Communication
Research, 2010)”

I found that higher levels of stereotype exaggeration predict lower expectations for public
deliberation. This finding implies that the differences partisans perceive there to be between
Democrats and Republicans matter (Scherer et al., 2015). Given the importance of partisan
stereotypes, it is only natural to study their precursors. This study showed that like-minded media
consumption, and to some extent affective polarization, lead to increased stereotype
exaggeration. These findings speak to how the modern media environment might be influencing
partisans’ beliefs about the qualities of Democrats and Republicans in ways that could further
polarize politics. In addition, these findings expose a hostility underlying partisans’ endorsement
of political stereotypes about SDO. Most importantly, the current study’s findings reveal
something insidious about exaggerated partisan stereotypes. Exaggerated stereotypes may be
hurting a central facet of democracy: Public deliberation. Ultimately, a deeper understanding of
political stereotypes will be essential for promoting productive conversations amongst
Democrats and Republicans.
31
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Table 1
Age, Gender, Ethnicity, Education, Income, and Party Affiliation for Full Sample (N = 301)
_____________________________________________________________________________
Variable
N
%
_____________________________________________________________________________
1. Age
20 to 30
121
40.2
30 to 40
94
31.2
40 to 50
44
14.6
50 to 60
31
10.3
60 +
11
2.3
2. Gender
Male
153
50.8
Female
148
49.2
3. Ethnicity
White
218
72.4
Black or African American 30
10
Asian
26
8.6
Other
11
3.7
American Indian
2
0.7
Native Hawaiian
1
0.3
4. Education
High school graduate or less
22
7.3
Some college to associates
106
35.2
Bachelors to masters
166
55.2
Doctoral to professional
7
2.3
5. Income
29,999 or less
76
25.3
30,000 to 59,999
113
37.5
60,000 to 89,999
57
18.9
90,000 to 150,000 +
55
18.3
6. Party Affiliation
Democrat
174
57.8
Republican
85
28.2
Independent or other
42
14
_____________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________
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Table 2
Means and Standard Deviations for Each of the Continuous Regression Variables (N = 259)
_____________________________________________________________________________
Variable

M

SD

Scale Endpoints

_____________________________________________________________________________
Affective polarization
1. Out-party trait ratings

1.97

2.40

-6 to 6

2. Feeling thermometer

3.12

2.02

-6 to 6

3. Inter-party marriage

1.16

1.44

-4 to 4

-0.83

2.16

-3 to 3

5. Like-minded media

0.99

1.19

-4 to 4

6. Social media engagement

2.52

0.93

1 to 5

7. Public deliberation

4.23

1.45

1 to 7

8. Stereotype exaggeration

2.72

2.23

-6 to 6

4. Party affiliation

______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
Note: Like-minded = Like-minded media consumption; Public deliberation = Expectations for
public deliberation; Higher party affiliation scores represent stronger affiliation with the
Democratic Party

42

Table 3
Bivariate Correlations for each Variable in the Regression Analysis (N = 259)
_____________________________________________________________________________

Variable

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

_____________________________________________________________________________
1. Gender

-

2. Education

-.07

-

3. Party Affiliation

-.12 -.01

4. Like-minded media

.10

5. Social media

-.11 .09

-

.14* -.39*** -.05

-.04

-

6. Feeling Thermometer

.06

.06 -.30*** .55*** .09

7. Inter-Party Marriage

-.07 .10 .17** .39*** .10

.51*** -

8. Out-Party Trait Rating

.09

.54***.51***

.00 -.27*** .41*** .01

-

9. Stereotype exaggeration .19**.04 -.38***.37*** -.23*** .21** .00
10. Public deliberation

.07 -.02 -.04

-.11

.23*** .01

.33***

-.16** -.21**

-.20** -

_____________________________________________________________________________
Note: *p < .05; **p < .01;***p < .001; two-tailed. Like-minded media = Like-minded media
consumption; Social media = Social media engagement; Public deliberation = Expectations for
public deliberation
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Table 4
A Model Summary for Controls, Party Affiliation, Like-Minded Media Consumption, and
Affective Polarization as Predictors of Stereotype Exaggeration at Each Step (N = 259)
______________________________________________________________________________

Model

R

R2

SEE

ΔR2

ΔF

df 1

df 2

p

______________________________________________________________________________
1. Controls
.33

.11

2.11

.11

10.44

3

255

< .001

.49

.24

1.95

.13

44.83

1

254

< .001

.32

1.87

.08

6.95

4

250

< .001

2. Party affiliation

3. Media and affect
.56

_____________________________________________________________________________
Note: SEE = Standard Error of the Estimate; Controls = gender, education, and social media
engagement; Affective polarization = out-party trait ratings, feeling thermometer, and inter-party
marriage
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Table 5
ANOVA Summary Tables for Controls, Party Affiliation, Like-Minded Media Consumption, and
Affective Polarization as Predictors of Stereotype Exaggeration at Each Step (N = 259)
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
Model Source

SS

df

MS

F

p

____________________________________________________________________________
1

Regression

140.05

3

46.68

Residual

1140.33

255

4.47

Total

1280.38

258

10.44

< .001

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------2

Regression

311.13

4

77.78

Residual

969.25

254

3.816

Total

1280.38

258

20.38

< .001

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------3

Regression

408.10

8

51.01

Residual

872.28

250

3.49

Total

1280.38

258

14.62

< .001

_____________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________
Note: Controls = gender, education, and social media engagement; Affective polarization = outparty trait ratings, feeling thermometer, and inter-party marriage
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Table 6
Results of the Hierarchical Linear Regression Analyses with Controls, Party Affiliation, LikeMinded Media Consumption, and Affective Polarization as the Independent Variables at Each
Step Predicting Stereotype Exaggeration (N = 259)
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
95% CI
____________
Model
Variables
B
SE B
β
t
p
sr2
lower
upper
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
1
(Constant)
2.14
0.70
Gender
1.01
0.27
.23 3.81 < .001
.23
0.49
1.54
Education
0.15
0.10
.09 1.43
.16
.08
-0.06
0.35
Social Media -0.63
0.14 -.26 -4.43 < .001
-.26
-0.92
-0.35
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------2
(Constant)
2.21
0.65
Gender
0.80
0.25
.18 3.24
< .01
.18
0.31
1.29
Education
0.15 0.09
.09 1.61
.108
.09
-0.03
0.34
Social Media -0.67 0.13 -.28 -5.07 < .001
-.26
-0.93
-0.41
Party Aff.
-0.38 0.06
-.37 -6.70 < .001
-.37
-0.49
-0.27
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------3
(Constant)
1.89 0.63
Gender
0.72 0.24
.16 2.99 < .01
.16
0.24
1.19
Education
0.14 0.09
.08 1.53
.13
.08
-0.04
0.32
Social Media -0.62 0.13 -.26 -4.86 < .001 -.25
-0.88
-0.37
Party Aff.
-0.27 0.06 -.26 -4.49 < .001 -.25
-0.39
-0.15
Like-Minded -0.37 0.13
.20 2.92 < .01
.15
0.12
0.61
Feeling Ther. -0.09 0.08 -.08 -1.16
.25
-.06
-0.25
0.06
Out-Party
0.19 0.06
.20 3.09 <.01
.16
0.07
0.31
Inter-Party
0.03 0.10
.02 0.33
.74
.02
-0.17
0.24
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Note: Inter-Party = Inter-Party Marriage; Out-Party = Out-Party Trait Ratings; Like-Minded =
Like-Minded Media Consumption; Social Media = Social Media Engagement; Party Aff. = Party
Affiliation; Feeling Ther. = Feeling Thermometer; Controls = gender, education, and social
media engagement; Affective polarization = out-party trait ratings, feeling thermometer, and
inter-party marriage
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Figure 1. Overlapping histograms, featuring kernel density estimation, describing partisan
stereotypes about the average Democrat’s and the average Republican’s level of SDO. This
figure illustrates that partisans perceived that average Republican as higher in SDO than the
average Democrat by a large margin, t(258) = 32.17, p < .001, d = 2.00.
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Figure 2. Violin plot depicting how actual Democrats and Republicans in the sample differed in
their SDO. This figure demonstrates that actual Republicans in the sample had higher SDO than
actual Democrats in the sample, t(257) = -9.45, p < .001, d = 1.25.
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Figure 3. Graph of the standardized residuals for hierarchical multiple regression.
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.20**

.02

.20**
-.08
-.26***

Figure 4. Results of hierarchical multiple regression using standardized coefficients; Social
media engagement, education, and gender included as control variables, F(4, 254) = 20.38, p <
*

**

.001, MSE = 3.82, R2 = .24. p < .05; p < .01;

***

p < .001.
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0.64**

0.10*

*

total effect: c = -.13+
direct effect: c’ = -.07

Figure 5. Unstandardized regression coefficients for stereotype exaggeration mediating the
relationship between like-minded media consumption and expectations for public deliberation.
+

p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001
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Appendix A

The Psychology of Political Ideology
Welcome to “The Psychology of Political Ideology,” an experiment investigating the intricacies
of political ideology being conducted by students at Western Washington University. This online
survey will take about 10 to 15 minutes to complete. Informing you about the study and formally
seeking your consent is standard practice in our studies.

Consent Form

This study is about how political information is processed. It is being conducted by Kamran
Hughes. Please ask the researcher to explain anything you do not understand in regards to the
procedures.

There are no potential risks associated with participation in this study. You can decide not to join
the study. If you join the study, you can change your mind and quit at any time. There will be no
penalty or loss of services or benefits if you decide to not take part in the study or quit later. You
also have the right to choose not to respond to any item on the survey.
This is an online survey that will take about 10 to 15 minutes to complete. You cannot take part
in this study if you are under the age of 18. If you take part in this study you will be asked to rate
statements about how you deal with certain situations or feelings. After completing the survey
you will read a debriefing that outlines the study in more detail.
By participating in this study you are expanding the knowledge base of the field of psychology.
You may also gain a greater understanding of the measurement of psychological constructs and
the formation of your own attitudes.
After the completion of the study you may contact the researcher for information about the full
range of the study and the results by sending an email to hughesk6@wwu.edu. You may choose
not to participate in this study at any time.
The data for this study are being collected confidentially. Neither the researcher(s) nor anyone
else will be able to link your responses to you. The results may be published or presented at
professional meetings, but the identities of all research participants will not be disclosed. In
compliance with professional guidelines, the data will be kept for 3 years on a password
protected computer and flash drive.
Questions about your rights as a research subject should be directed to: Research and Sponsored
Programs Office at (360) 650-2146 or compliance@wwu.edu. In the event you suffer any
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adverse effects as a result of your participation, you should contact the primary researcher at
hughesk6@wwu.edu or the Research and Sponsored Programs Office listed above.
By clicking the arrow and continuing:
●
●
●
●

You understand the information given to you in this form
You have been told how you can ask questions and state any concerns
You acknowledge that the researcher has responded to any questions you've submitted
You believe you understand the research study and the potential benefits and risks that are
involved.

You are encouraged to print a copy of this consent form for your records.
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Appendix B
Instructions for Experimental Manipulation
On the following pages, you will be answering the same set of questions from three different
perspectives: average Democrat, average Republican, and your own personal perspective. On the
top of each page we state the perspective you are to adopt for that page in bold and italics. We
will ask you about the perspective at the end of the page.
Thank you for paying close attention to these instructions.

SDO Scale Instructions (Ho et al., 2015) (Prompt wording influenced by Graham et al., 2012)
Indicate how much you think the average Republican (Democrat) would favor or oppose each
idea below. Use the following rating scale: Strongly Oppose – Strongly Favor. You can work
quickly; your first feeling is generally best. Remember, instead of selecting your own answers;
answer all the questions as the average Democrat (Republican).
Viewpoint manipulation check
I just took this page of the survey as…..
Response options: the average Democrat, the average Republican, the average independent,
myself
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Appendix C
Expectations for Public Deliberation (adapted from Hwang et al., 2014)
Instructions: Imagine yourself taking part in a town hall meeting that consists of both Democrats
and Republicans. There are approximately 30 people at the meeting and they are discussing
national policy issues. Please rate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following
statements about how the discussion will go.
The conversation would resolve conflicts among participants with differing views on the issues.
The conversation would be useful for participants to gain a better understanding of the issues.
The conversation would help participants see the issues from multiple perspectives.
The conversation would lead participants to be more open to the opposing views.
(Response options range from 1(Strongly disagree) to 7(Strongly agree))
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